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Department of Social Sciences, Humboldt-Universit€at zu Berlin, Berlin, Germany
ABSTRACT
Interest groups are important intermediary organisations that function as a
transmission belt between societal interests and political decision-makers.
However, while some interest groups survive over decades, others only last a
few years. This article argues that the survival of interest groups depends on
their ability to mobilise resources which is crucially affected by interest group
type and the public salience of an interest group’s policy domain. The theor-
etical expectations are tested based on a novel dataset mapping the survival
of 1699 interest groups registered at the German Bundestag between 1974
and 2012. Using event history analysis, it is shown that interest group type
and public salience indeed affect whether interest groups survive. Sectional
groups last significantly longer than cause groups, and interest group survival
increases with the public salience of their policy area. The results have major
implications for our understanding of interest groups and political representa-
tion in contemporary democracies.
KEYWORDS Interest groups; cause groups; sectional groups; survival analysis; interest
representation
Why does interest group survival vary across groups? Interest groups are
important intermediary organisations that function as a transmission belt
between societal interests and political decision-makers. Interest groups
aggregate and articulate both the interests of individual citizens but also
the interests of corporate and collective actors such as firms and public
institutions. Interest groups are therefore an important vehicle for the
pluralist representation of all sorts of societal interests. Moreover, interest
groups ensure a long-term interest intermediation through formally
organised structures. However, while some interest groups represent soci-
etal interests over decades, others only last a few years.
As effective interest representation crucially depends on the existence
of an organised interest group that lobbies decision-makers on behalf of
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its constituents, it is highly problematic for the representation of societal
interests if their interest associations are unstable and dissolved shortly
after being established. At the same time long-term survival could also be
problematic for democracy if interest groups representing powerful eco-
nomic interests not only have advantages in mobilisation, but also with
regard to survival, as this could lead to a lock-in of the representation
bias. Given that interest groups play a fundamental role in Western
democracies as they importantly bridge the gap between society and polit-
ical decision-makers, it is crucial to understand why some groups last lon-
ger than others. Is there for instance a bias towards powerful economic
interests? Are interest groups representing powerful economic actors
more stable than, for example, NGOs?
A number of scholars have focused on explaining why interest groups
organise and mobilise and why the density of interest group systems
varies across sectors and across countries (e.g. Berkhout et al. 2015; Gray
and Lowery 1996b; Leech et al. 2005; Lowery and Gray 1995; Rasmussen
and Carroll 2014). These studies have made an important contribution to
our understanding of interest group survival by studying, amongst others,
the mortality rate of interest groups at the system level (e.g. Gray and
Lowery 1995, 2001). They found that rates of demise are positively
affected by interest group density while rates of demise decrease as party
competition intensifies. A related line of research investigates interest
group mortality anxiety. Gray and Lowery (1997) studied mortality anx-
iety in the US states and found that mortality anxiety decreases as interest
groups rely more strongly on internal sources of revenue, when member-
ship size is large and when policy areas are less conflictual while anxiety
increases when interest groups face strong competition. Halpin and
Thomas (2012) examined interest group mortality anxiety drawing on a
survey of Scottish organisations and found that competition by other
groups and shrinking membership size lead to higher anxiety levels while
resources and the number of domains covered by groups lead to lower
levels of mortality anxiety.
There are only a handful of studies that directly explore the determi-
nants of interest group survival on the level of individual interest groups.
Based on a comparison of Danish interest group populations at three
time points, Fisker (2015) studied the factors that explain why interest
groups have survived or died between 1976 and 2010 and between 1993
and 2010. She found that resources and a privileged position in the deci-
sion-making process have a positive effect on interest group survival.
Nownes and Lipinski (2005) studied the survival of gay and lesbian rights
interest groups in the United States and found that interest group survival
is negatively affected by interest group density. Bevan (2013) analysed the
WEST EUROPEAN POLITICS 1437
survival of voluntary organisations in the US and found that groups that
seek political influence last longer than other voluntary organisations and
that group resources, professional membership, advocating for a social
cause and government attention are associated with longer survival while
public salience decreases survival.
This article contributes to this emerging literature and provides a com-
prehensive analysis of interest group survival that is based on a longitu-
dinal analysis of 1699 interest groups registered at the German Bundestag
between 1974 and 2012. Germany is an interesting case due to its corpor-
atist interest intermediation patterns that may lead to comparatively high
aggregate levels of survival in comparison to the pluralist US system. It is
argued that resource mobilisation is a crucial determinant of interest
group survival. More specifically, it is hypothesised that the survival of
interest groups depends on their ability to mobilise resources, which is
crucially affected by interest group type and the public salience of the pol-
icy area in which they are active. Using event history analysis, it is shown
that interest group type and public salience importantly determine
whether interest groups survive. Sectional groups last significantly longer
than cause groups and interest group survival increases with the public
salience of the policy area in which interest groups are active.
The results have major implications for our understanding of interest
groups and political representation in contemporary democracies.
Shedding light on which groups are sustainable in the long run is central
for our understanding of representative democracy. Interest groups func-
tion as important intermediary organisations that aggregate and articulate
the concerns of societal groups towards political institutions. Interest
group lobbying ensures that societal interests are heard by politicians so
that policy-making is not insulated from the concerns of affected societal
groups. However, an important condition for effective interest representa-
tion is the long-term survival of interest groups as gaining access and
obtaining the trust of policy-makers is a process that simply takes time.
As a result, investigating why interest group survival varies and whether
there is potentially a bias favouring powerful economic interests is
important for understanding which societal interests are effectively repre-
sented before government.
Resource mobilisation and interest group survival
According to Beyers et al. (2008: 1106–9), three features must be given to
define an actor as an interest group: organisation, political interest and
informality. In order to qualify as an interest group, political actors must
draw on some sort of organisation, actors must pursue the objective to
influence political decision-making (political interest) and interest groups
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do not compete in elections (informality). I add a fourth characteristic
that distinguishes interest groups from companies: Interest groups are
organisations that rely on constituents for their survival. Constituents can
be individual citizens, companies or institutions that share a common
policy objective and provide resources to interest groups. It has to be
noted that constituents are not necessarily formal members of interest
groups, but they can also merely support interest groups by provid-
ing resources.
I assume that the basic concern of interest groups is survival, the most
fundamental objective of organisations (e.g. Gray and Lowery 1996a;
Lowery 2007). All other goals of interest groups are secondary since sur-
vival is the precondition for achieving any of the other objectives. Since
constituents are their main resource providers, interest groups compete
for members to extract from them adequate resources to ensure their
survival (McCarthy and Zald 1977; Schmitter and Streeck 1999).
Constituents can be individual citizens or other organisations such as
companies, public authorities or other associations. I expect that the abil-
ity of interest groups to mobilise resources from supporters is crucially
affected by the public salience of the policy they are working in and by
interest group type.
Public salience
An important reason why individuals or organisations establish and sup-
port interest groups is interest representation. Individual or collective
members delegate the representation of their interests to associations
which lobby political institutions in order to realise their political inter-
ests. Members therefore expect that their interest groups influence legisla-
tors so that the policy outcome is as close as possible to their policy
preferences. For instance, individuals become members of an environ-
mental group since the protection of the environment is important to
them. They provide resources such as financial contributions or labour to
the environmental group and expect in exchange that it lobbies legislators
in order to improve environmental protection.
Gray and Lowery argue that the mere existence of potential constitu-
ents does not necessarily imply that they are willing to equip interest
groups with valuable resources (Gray and Lowery 1996b; Lowery and
Gray 1995). Even though citizens or firms might deem a policy area very
important, they might be satisfied with the status quo and thus do not
have any incentives to invest in costly lobbying. It is therefore necessary
that there is a latent group of potential constituents that share a common
objective, but it is also important that this interest is salient to potential
supporters. I accordingly expect that the public salience of the policy area
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in which interest groups are active importantly affects the ability of inter-
est groups to mobilise resources. If public salience of a policy area is very
high, potential constituents are more willing to invest resources for inter-
est group lobbying in that policy area (see also Bevan 2013: 549). In times
of high public salience of a policy area, it is likely that governments will
respond to the demands in one way or another (Hobolt and Klemmensen
2008; Kl€uver forthcoming; Wlezien 1995). In such a situation, supporters
are willing to provide more resources to interest group lobbying either
because they want to defend the status quo in times of heightened atten-
tion or they want to seize the window of opportunity and promote policy
change. Thus, I expect that the ability of interest groups to mobilise
resources to sustain themselves is crucially affected by the public salience
of the policy area they are lobbying in.
Hypothesis 1: Interest group survival is positively affected by the salience of
the policy area in which interest groups are active.
Interest group type
Interest group scholars distinguish between different types of interest
groups that vary in their collective action potential (e.g. D€ur and De
Bievre 2007; Giger and Kl€uver 2016; Kl€uver 2012; Offe 1969; Olson 1965).
Researchers employ varying definitions to capture differences in interest
group type such as public vs. private interest groups or specific vs. diffuse
interest groups. I distinguish between cause groups and sectional groups
(Giger and Kl€uver 2016; Kl€uver 2012; Stewart 1958). Cause groups are
interest groups which fight for a general belief or principle such as envir-
onmental protection or human rights. Anyone who supports that belief
can join the group as membership is not restricted. The supporters of
cause groups are typically individual citizens and the nature of the inter-
ests that cause groups represent is diffuse; that is, their policy goals are
only associated with diffuse costs and benefits. Sectional groups by con-
trast represent the special interests of a specific segment of society, such
as the interests of pharmacists, electricity companies or workers in the
automobile industry. Their purpose is to represent the special interests of
this particular sector and their membership is usually limited to actors in
that sector.
Sectional groups represent well-defined homogeneous constituencies
with concentrated costs and benefits. Since these interests are typically of
primary material concern to their constituents, they are willing to invest
money and time in establishing and maintaining an interest group which
defends their common interests (Offe and Vale 1972: 86). The benefits of
collective action are higher than its costs and potential constituents of
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sectional groups therefore face strong incentives to engage in collective
action. In addition, as sectional groups typically represent economic sec-
tors such as the automobile industry or farmers, potential constituents of
sectional groups are on average well-equipped with resources so that they
can easily afford to support an interest group that represents their inter-
ests (see also D€ur and De Bievre 2007). By contrast, cause groups are not
related to the material needs of a small and homogeneous group of con-
stituents, but to diffuse benefits of a large heterogeneous group of citizens
(Offe and Vale 1972: 86). The costs of engaging in collective action are
therefore higher than its benefits and potential constituents have little
incentive to invest resources in lobbying. Moreover, cause groups much
more fiercely compete against each other for members since their mem-
bership structure is not clearly circumscribed as it is for sectional groups.
Their membership is therefore more fluid and the flow of resources more
unstable. In addition, unlike constituents of sectional groups which are
usually corporate actors that are well-equipped with resources, citizens
have on average only a limited amount of resources at their disposal
which makes it difficult to spend a lot of money on lobbying. In conclu-
sion, given that the incentives to engage in collective action and the
resources available to supporters are considerably higher for potential
constituents of sectional groups than for supporters of cause groups,
I expect that sectional groups find it considerably easier to obtain resour-
ces from their supporters than cause groups.
Hypothesis 2: Sectional groups on average survive longer than cause groups.
Research design
Case selection
In order to study interest group survival, I have selected Germany for
analysis for the following reason: the German Bundestag lobbying register
was established as early as 1974 and it annually maps the population of
interest groups up to the present. According to the rules of regulation of
the Bundestag, interest groups can only participate in hearings and obtain
a door pass to enter the parliament if they are registered (Deutscher
Bundestag 2014: 111). The Bundestag register is therefore an ideal data
source to trace the survival of interest groups as it is reasonable to expect
that all national-level interest groups have strong incentives to register at
the Bundestag while organisations that are only politically active at the
regional or local level are excluded. In addition, Germany is an interesting
case due to its corporatist interest intermediation patterns that make it
very different from the pluralist US system where most of the previous
research on interest group survival has been conducted. The corporatist
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structures in place in Germany may lead to comparatively high aggregate
levels of survival as access provision by policy-makers in favour of
encompassing groups or government recognition for certain services
should enhance the survival of recipient groups over the longer term. It is
therefore important to shed light on the determinants of interest group
survival in a corporatist setting like Germany.
Dependent variable
In order to study interest group survival, the annually published interest
group register was converted into a longitudinal dataset of all interest
groups that registered at the Bundestag between 1974 and 2012. I encoun-
tered the phenomenon that sometimes different groups merged and in
those cases, these groups have been treated as a new interest group reflect-
ing the organisational change that took place.1 To measure the duration of
interest group survival, I obtained the year in which an interest group was
established and the year when the interest group last registered in the
Bundestag lobby list. Based on this information, I computed the age in
years to measure the duration of interest group survival. The age of interest
groups varies substantially. The mean age is 45 years, with a standard devi-
ation of 35 years (see Figure 1; and Table A1 in the online appendix). If we
distinguish between cause and sectional group, the average age amounts to
42 years for cause groups and 48 years for sectional groups.
To measure the year in which an interest group was founded, I made
use of several data sources. First, I relied on information retrieved from
the websites of interest groups. Second, if there was no information about
the founding year on the interest group homepages, a more extensive
internet search was conducted primarily relying on Wikipedia and online
public affairs directories to identify the founding year of an interest
group. Finally, if none of these searches was successful, interest groups
were phoned and asked about the year in which their group was estab-
lished. Altogether, I was able to measure the age and trace the Bundestag
registration for 1699 interest groups over the period 1974 until 2012.2
Given that the independent variables change over time, the interest
group survival data was recorded annually in the time period of investiga-
tion to allow for state changes (Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn 2001). An
interest group is accordingly included in the dataset as many times as it
registered throughout the 1974 to 2012 period. If an interest group was
still registered in 2012 when the register was last coded, it was coded as
survival. If an interest group was no longer registered, it was coded as
non-survival. Overall, about 20% of all interest groups in the dataset were
dissolved during the time period of investigation. Of all the groups that
are still in place at the end of our period of analysis (2012), the mean age
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is 47 years (standard deviation is 36 years) ranging from a minimum of 1
to a maximum of 188 years.
All interest groups included in the dataset were classified into policy
areas according to the Policy Agendas Topic Codebook to identify the
policy area in which interest groups are active. The Topic Codebook was
originally developed by the US Policy Agendas Project (Baumgartner and
Jones 1993) and later updated in the framework of the Comparative
Agendas Project which maps the policy agenda by manually coding policy
documents into policy areas. I relied on a revised version of the codebook
designed by Breunig (2013) which takes into account the specificities of
the German political system and I moreover slightly adjusted that code-
book for interest group data. Altogether, interest groups were classified
into 22 policy areas (see Table A2 in the online appendix).3 Human
coders classified interest groups into policy areas based on information
about their interests and activities that the interest groups provide in the
lobbying register and by additionally relying on information retrieved
from interest group websites and from phone calls with interest groups.
It has to be noted that even though we observe interest groups over sev-
eral years, none of the interest groups changed its policy profile in such a
way that necessitated a different policy agendas code. Reliability tests indi-
cate high levels of correspondence between different coders as the
Krippendorff alpha amounts to 0.93 for the major topic codes and 0.80
for the subtopic codes.4
Independent variables
In order to test the first hypothesis postulating a positive effect of public
salience on interest group survival, I rely on data on the policy priorities
of citizens obtained from a monthly public opinion poll called
Politbarometer. Ever since 1986, the Politbarometer has included a ques-
tion that asks respondents about the most important problem which I
used to measure the public salience of a policy area. The most important
problem question (MIP) is a standard tool for measuring the relative
importance of issues to voters. It has to be noted, however, that the MIP
question is only a crude proxy for the relative importance of a policy area
and particularly does not provide precise information about the import-
ance of an interest group to its constituents. To match the public opinion
data with the interest group dataset, the issues named by survey respond-
ents were also classified into policy areas according to the extended ver-
sion of the Policy Agendas Topic Codebook (see Table A2 in the online
appendix). The percentage of respondents who named a major policy area
as important serves as a measure of the public salience of that policy
domain. Figure A1 illustrates how public salience varies across policy
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areas and over time. Macroeconomics is by far the most important
policy area, followed by civil rights and social welfare. International polit-
ics and environmental protection are also policy areas that are increasing
in importance, while reunification dominated the agenda in the early
1990s and other policy areas become important at times (e.g. finance dur-
ing the recent financial crisis).
To test whether interest group type explains how long interest groups
survive, interest groups were classified as either ‘cause’ or ‘sectional groups’
(Stewart 1958) based on the nature of the interest they represent and on
their membership structure. I relied on information about the nature of the
interest and the membership structure that was provided in the lobbying
register and on information that was retrieved from interest group websites.
Figure A2 in the online appendix provides an overview of the number of
cause and sectional groups across policy areas over time. While some policy
areas are more densely populated by cause groups (e.g. civil rights, inter-
national politics, social welfare) sectional groups are more numerous in
other policy fields (e.g. macroeconomics, finance) while in still other policy
domains there is not much difference (e.g. labour/immigration, defence
and foreign trade). The correlation amounts to 0.58.
As alternative explanatory factors may potentially confound the hypothes-
ised relationships, I include the following control variables in the model.
First, I control for government activity, as Lowery and Gray (1995) and Gray
and Lowery (1996b) show that interest group density is crucially shaped by
government activity. Government activity is operationalised by relying on
data on public expenditure (see also Soroka and Wlezien 2010; Wlezien 1995;
Wlezien and Soroka 2012). I rely on the public expenditure data released by
the German Federal Ministry of Finance which corresponds to the percentage
expenditure of all federal public spending. This data covers all public expendi-
tures at the federal level which are directly controlled by the German federal
government. The correlation between government spending and public sali-
ence only amounts to 0.35 so that they are only moderately related.
Second, I control for the number of competitors and the number of new
competitors in a policy area, as several scholars have found that the number
of other interest groups competing for members and influence in the same
policy sector is positively related to interest group dissolution and rates of
demise (Gray and Lowery 1995, 1996b, 2001; Lowery and Gray 1995;
Nownes and Lipinski 2005). I accordingly expect that there is a crowding-
out effect at play when it comes to interest group mobilisation. As interest
groups compete for scarce resources to sustain themselves, competition
between interest groups for resources intensifies as the number of interest
groups increases in a policy domain. Thus, the larger the number of (new)
competitors, the more intensive the competition over supporters and scarce
resources. As a result, the growth rate of the interest group population
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should slow down. I therefore expect that the number of (new) competitors
negatively affects interest group survival as an interest group faces more
competitors in the struggle for scarce resources. The number of competi-
tors is measured by the overall number of other interest groups in the
same policy sector in a given year while the number of new competitors is
measured by the number of newly registered interest groups in the same
policy domain in a given year. Third, German reunification constitutes an
important external shock that fundamentally changed Germany’s interest
group system. I include a structural break control to capture this external
shock. This variable is coded 0 before German reunification and 1 after-
wards. Table A1 in the online appendix provides summary statistics for all
variables included in the analysis.
Data analysis
Figure 1 presents a histogram of the age of the 1699 interest groups in
the dataset. The figure shows that there is considerable variation across
groups and several peaks in the distribution. A first peak can be identified
at an interest group age around approximately 22 years. That peak is
hardly surprising as a large number of interest groups were newly estab-
lished after German reunification, such as the Association of German
Railway Customers (1990), the Association of German Civil Law Notaries
(1991) or the Association of Working Mothers (1990). The second peak
can be found at about 63 years, which indicates that a large number of
interest groups were established after the Second World War, coinciding
with the foundation of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949; these
include the Federation of German Industries (1949), the German Trade
Union Confederation (1949) and the German Hotel and Restaurant
Association (1949). Finally, a number of interest groups reached an age of
about 120–130 years, indicating that they were founded during the 1870s,
the 1880s and the 1890s, shortly after the foundation of the German
empire in 1871. For instance, the German Lawyers Association was
founded in 1871, the German Chemical Industry Association was estab-
lished in 1877 and the Workers’ Samaritan Federation was founded in
1888. Thus, the development of the German interest group population is
strongly affected by historical developments leading to a considerable
transformation of the German interest group system in line with regime
changes throughout Germany’s history.
In order to test the theoretical expectations, I rely on event history ana-
lysis as interest survival is measured by the number of years an interest
group has survived. Event history models are designed to model duration
data where the phenomenon of interest is duration until a certain event
occurs, in this case the duration until an interest group is dissolved. The
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unit of analysis is a (unique) interest group that registered at the
Bundestag. The dependent variable is the number of years between an
interest group’s foundation and its last registration at the Bundestag.
During this time frame, it might happen that important changes occur that
affect the interest group’s survival (Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn 2001). State
changes occur in this study with regard to the number of competitors, the
number of new competitors and public salience, which can take on differ-
ent values from year to year. This implies that an interest group is recorded
for as many years in the dataset as it registered at the Bundestag to take
into account the state changes of these variables over the years.
I estimate a semi-parametric Cox model as we do not have any a priori
assumptions about the specific probability distribution for the time until
an interest group ceases to exist (see also Nownes and Lipinski 2005). An
important assumption of the semi-parametric Cox model is that the haz-
ard function of each observation follows exactly the same pattern over
time. Violations of this assumption might result in biased coefficient esti-
mates and decreased power of significance tests (Box-Steffensmeier and
Zorn 2001: 974). I therefore first tested this assumption based on the
Schoenfeld residuals (see Tables A3, A4 and A5 in the online appendix).
The results show that three of the predictors in model 3 violate the pro-
portional hazards assumption, namely the number of competitors, the
number of new competitors and reunification.
Following the procedure suggested by Box-Steffensmeier (2001),
I therefore estimated Cox models including time-varying coefficients for
the number of competitors, the number of new competitors and
Figure 1. The survival of interest groups in the German Bundestag.
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reunification in model 3. The incorporation of time-varying coefficients
allows for taking into account that the effects of these independent varia-
bles vary over time. Table 1 presents the results of the models.5 Model 1
only includes the two explanatory variables group type and public sali-
ence, while model 2 additionally includes the control variables and model
3 also comprises the structural break control for reunification. The effects
are reported as coefficients. Coefficients with a negative value indicate a
positive effect on interest group survival while positive values indicate a
negative effect on survival.
The results of the Cox regression models provide evidence in line with
both hypotheses. First, the public salience of a policy area has a statistic-
ally significant positive effect on interest group survival across all three
model specifications. The higher the salience of the policy area among the
general public, the longer interest groups can on average sustain them-
selves. Thus, interest groups working in policy areas that are important to
the general public find it considerably easier to sustain themselves than
interest groups lobbying in policy domains that are of little importance to
the general public. The empirical evidence therefore supports hypothesis
1 that the public salience of a policy area positively affects the survival of
interest groups. Second, interest group type crucially matters for interest
group survival. Cause groups have a much harder time to sustain them-
selves compared to sectional groups. More specifically, the risk of dissol-
ution is 1.350 times higher for cause than for sectional groups.6
Table 1. Results from Cox regression.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Main
Cause groups 0.381 0.443 0.301
(0.111) (0.138) (0.119)
Public salience –0.005 –0.010 –0.006
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Government activity 0.000 –0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
No. of competitors 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)





No. of competitors ln(t) –0.000
(0.000)




N 25,666 25,666 25,666
Subjects 1,699 1,699 1,699
Failures 339 339 339
Log pseudolikelihood –2249 –2242 –2139

p 0.01; p 0.05; p 0.10; Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses.
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As cause groups suffer much more from collective action problems
than sectional groups, it is much more difficult for them to mobilise
potential supporters and obtain the resources from them that are neces-
sary for their survival. Sectional groups by contrast represent well-circum-
scribed constituencies that typically fight for concentrated economic
interests of their supporters so that resource mobilisation is a much
smaller problem.7 The effects of public salience and interest group type
on interest group survival are further illustrated in Figures 2 and 3.
Figure 2. The effect of public salience.
Figure 3. The effect of interest group type.
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These figures show the values for the cumulative hazard function
(Cleves et al. 2008) based on the smallest and largest values for public
salience (Figure 2) and for the difference between cause and sectional
groups (Figure 3) respectively. The y-axis shows the cumulative hazard
representing the share of interest groups that are dissolved and the x-axis
shows the age of interest groups in years. Figures 2 and 3 clearly show
that public salience and interest group type have an important substantive
effect on interest group survival. Thus, interest groups lobbying in policy
areas that are important to a lot of people in a society can sustain them-
selves significantly longer than interest groups working in policy areas
that are not important to many citizens. Similarly, sectional groups repre-
senting the special interests of a specific sector of society such as business
associations or trade unions persist significantly longer than cause groups
such as environmental or human rights groups.
In order to further test the robustness of the results, I have estimated
two additional Cox regression models. First, given that the lobbying regis-
ter only started in 1974, we simply do not know whether interest groups
registered in 1974 had already been lobbying the Bundestag before that. I
therefore estimated an additional Cox regression that excludes all interest
groups that were registered in 1974 to check whether the results hold
when we only analyse those interest groups for which we know the year
in which they lobbied the Bundestag for the first time. The results of the
additional Cox regression are in line with the presented findings (see
Table A6 in the online appendix). While public salience has a statistically
significant positive effect on interest group survival, cause groups face a
significantly higher risk of dissolution.
Second, as interest groups that are large umbrella associations might
last significantly longer due to their superior position in the interest
group system, I have also estimated an additional Cox regression control-
ling for whether an interest group is an umbrella association. The results
are reported in Table A7 in the online appendix. While umbrella associa-
tions indeed last significantly longer, the effects of the explanatory varia-
bles – interest group type and public salience – still hold.
Conclusion
Why do some interest groups exist several decades or even centuries
while other interest groups disappear after just a few years? This article
has addressed this important question by analysing the survival of 1699
interest groups registered at the German Bundestag between 1974 and
2012. The empirical results show that the survival of interest groups is
crucially affected by interest group type and the public salience of the pol-
icy area they are working in.
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The results have important implications for our understanding of inter-
est group mobilisation and political representation. As it is important for
societal interests to be represented by a well-organised interest group that
effectively advocates for their preferences in the political arena, under-
standing why interest groups survive has important implications for the
representation of societal interests in Western societies more generally.
Basically, the findings indicate that societal interests in highly salient pol-
icy areas have a much better chance to be effectively represented. Thus,
societal groups in a publicly salient policy domain can much more easily
mobilise resources and overcome the hurdles of collective action than
societal interests in a policy area that is largely insulated from public
interest. While one may view this result positively given that societal
interests salient to a large part of the electorate are better represented,
one may also raise negative normative concerns as particularly those soci-
etal interests that are marginalised in societies cannot organise effective
interest representation. However, as the recent Fridays for Future move-
ment has forcefully demonstrated, a previously neglected policy area can
come to dominate public debate. Thus, public salience is not exogenous,
but the salience of policy areas changes over time amongst others due to
the activities of interest groups. Future research should therefore shed
light on how interest groups can affect the salience of policy areas.
This study has furthermore demonstrated that interest group type also
plays an important role for interest group survival. Sectional groups typic-
ally representing economic sectors such as the automobile industry or
farmers find it a lot easier to sustain themselves in the long run than
cause groups that represent diffuse societal interests such as environmen-
tal protection or human rights. As a result, the often voiced concern that
interest group systems are biased towards economic interests also holds
for interest group survival. Sectional interest groups are systematically
advantaged over cause groups as they represent the economic interests of
a clearly circumscribed constituency that is typically well-endowed with
resources to ensure the long-term survival of the interest groups. Cause
groups by contrast constantly face the problem of attracting supporters
and obtaining from them the necessary resources to ensure their survival.
Diffuse societal interests are therefore not only disadvantaged when it
comes to mobilisation, but also when it comes to maintaining an organ-
ised interest group fighting for their cause. In conclusion, the often cited
bias in the ‘heavenly chorus’ (Lowery et al. 2015; Schattschneider 1960) is
partly a result of collective action problems that make it difficult for cause
groups to maintain their long-term survival.
While this study has made an important contribution by investigating
interest group survival outside the US, there are important avenues for
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future research. First, the analysis was limited to examining interest group
survival in Germany. As Germany shares many similarities with other
Western democracies, such as its parliamentary system, its experience
with coalition governments, its corporatist interest intermediation patterns
and the composition of the interest group population (Leech et al. 2005;
Rasmussen 2015; Wonka et al. 2010), it is reasonable not to expect funda-
mentally different results in other countries. However, external validity is
best achieved by comparative research, so future studies should extend
the analysis to other countries and other institutional settings. Second, an
important avenue for future research is to further shed light on the rela-
tionship between interest groups and citizen preferences. Do interest
groups provide a balanced picture of societal interests? Further, do inter-
est groups really take up the concerns of citizens or do interest groups
also shape citizen preferences?
Notes
1. I have estimated an additional model in which I control for whether an
interest group has undergone a merger with another interest group (see Table
A9 in the online appendix). Having undergone a merger does not significantly
affect interest group survival while the main results remain robust.
2. Overall, we identified 3473 distinct interest groups that registered between
1974 and 2012 at the Bundestag. An inspection of the distribution of key
variables in the full and the analysis sample presented in Table A11 in the
online appendix shows that there is no indication of a selection bias due to
missingness (Rubin 1976).
3. Given that the original codebook was developed to classify bills and other
policy documents into policy areas, the 225 sub-issues are very fine-grained.
Since interest groups compete in broader areas, I only rely on the major
policy areas to classify interest groups.
4. The interest group registration data including the policy area classifications based
on the Policy Agendas Codebook is made available on the website of the author.
5. In order to check the robustness of the results, I have also estimated two
additional specifications in which fixed effects for policy areas and years are
included (see Table A8 in the online appendix). The effect of public salience
is not statistically significant in the issue-area fixed effects model, but
statistically significant in the year fixed effect model. This suggests that it is
primarily variation across policy domain that accounts for the public salience
effect on interest group survival.
6. The hazard ratio for the cause group coefficient in model 3 is 1.350.
7. One could expect that there is an interaction effect at play between interest
group type and public salience such that cause groups benefit more from
public salience than sectional groups. In order to test whether this is the case,
I have run an additional Cox model in which group type is interacted with
public salience (see Table A10 in the online appendix). The results show that
the effect of public salience is not conditioned by interest group type so that
both cause and sectional groups are similarly affected by public salience.
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